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Abstract. We deal with zero-sum limiting average stochastic games. We show that the existence
of arbitrary optimal strategies implies the existence of stationary ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0,
and the existence of Markov optimal strategies. We present such a construction for which we do
not even need to know these optimal strategies. Furthermore, an example demonstrates that the
existence of stationary optimal strategies is not implied by the existence of optimal strategies, so the
result is sharp.
More generally, one can evaluate a strategy π for the maximizing player, player 1, by the reward
φs(π) that π guarantees to him when starting in state s. A strategy π is called nonimproving if
φs(π) ≥ φs(π[h]) for all s and for all finite histories h with final state s, where π[h] is the strategy π
conditional on the history h. Using the evaluation φ, we may define the relation “ε-better” between
strategies. A strategy π1 is called ε-better than π2 if φs(π1) ≥ φs(π2) − ε for all s. We show that
for any nonimproving strategy π, for all ε > 0, there exists an ε-better stationary strategy and a
(0-)better Markov strategy as well. Since all optimal strategies are nonimproving, this result can be
regarded as a generalization of the above result for optimal strategies.
Finally, we briefly discuss some other extensions. Among others, we indicate possible simplifica-
tions of strategies that are only optimal for particular initial states by “almost stationary” ε-optimal
strategies, for all ε > 0, and by “almost Markov” optimal strategies. We also discuss the validity of
the above results for other reward functions. Several examples clarify these issues.
Key words. stochastic games, limiting average rewards, optimality, Markov strategies, station-
ary strategies
AMS subject classifications. 90D15, 90D20, 90D05
PII. S0363012996311940
1. Introduction. A zero-sum stochastic game Γ can be described by a state
space S := {1, . . . , z} and a corresponding collection {M1, . . . ,Mz} of matrices, where
matrixMs has sizem
1
s×m2s and, for is ∈ Is := {1, . . . ,m1s} and js ∈ Js := {1, . . . ,m2s},
entry (is, js) of Ms consists of a payoff r(s, is, js) ∈ R and a probability vector
p(s, is, js) = (p(1|s, is, js), . . . , p(z|s, is, js)). The elements of S are called states and
for each state s ∈ S the elements of Is and Js are called the actions of player 1 and
player 2 in state s. The game is to be played at stages in N in the following way.
The play starts at stage 1 in an initial state, say, in state s1 ∈ S, where, simulta-
neously and independently, both players are to choose an action: player 1 chooses
an i1s1 ∈ Is1 , while player 2 chooses a j1s1 ∈ Js1 . These choices induce an immediate
payoff r(s1, i1s1 , j
1
s1) from player 2 to player 1. Next, the play moves to a new state
according to the probability vector p(s1, i1s1 , j
1
s1), say, to state s
2. At stage 2 new
actions i2s2 ∈ Is2 and j2s2 ∈ Js2 are to be chosen by the players in state s2. Then
player 1 receives payoff r(s2, i2s2 , j
2
s2) from player 2 and the play moves to some state
s3 according to the probability vector p(s2, i2s2 , j
2
s2), and so on.
The sequence (s1, i1s1 , j
1
s1 ; . . . ; s
n−1, in−1sn−1 , j
n−1
sn−1 ; s
n) is called the history up to
stage n. The players are assumed to have complete information and perfect recall.
A mixed action for a player in state s is a probability distribution on the set of
his actions in state s. Mixed actions in state s will be denoted by xs for player 1 and
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1332 J. FLESCH, F. THUIJSMAN, AND O. J. VRIEZE
by ys for player 2, and the sets of mixed actions in state s by Xs and Ys, respectively.
A strategy is a decision rule that prescribes a mixed action for any finite history of
the play. Such general strategies, so-called behavior strategies, will be denoted by π
for player 1 and by σ for player 2, and π(h) and σ(h) will denote the mixed actions
for history h. We use the notations Π and Σ, respectively, for the behavior strategy
spaces of players 1 and 2. If for all finite histories, the mixed actions prescribed by
a strategy only depend on the current stage and state, then the strategy is called
Markov, while if they only depend on the state then the strategy is called stationary.
Thus the stationary strategy spaces are X := ×s∈S Xs for player 1 and Y := ×s∈S Ys
for player 2, while the Markov strategy spaces are F := ×n∈N X for player 1 and
G := ×n∈N Y for player 2. We will use the respective notations x and y for stationary
strategies and f and g for Markov strategies for players 1 and 2. A stationary strategy
is called pure if, for each state, it specifies one “pure” action to be used. Hence the
spaces of pure stationary strategies are I := ×s∈S Is for player 1 and J := ×s∈S Js
for player 2. Pure stationary strategies will be denoted by i and j, respectively.
Let H denote the set of finite histories, H(α, ω) the set of finite histories with
initial state α and final state ω, H(α, ·) the set of finite histories with initial state
α, and H(·, ω) the set of finite histories with final state ω. For any strategy π and
for any given history h ∈ H(·, ω), we can define the strategy π[h] which prescribes a
mixed action π[h](h̄) to each history h̄ ∈ H(ω, ·) as if h had happened before h̄, i.e.,
π[h](h̄) = π(hh̄), where hh̄ is the history consisting of h concatenated with h̄.
Payoffs and transition probabilities can be naturally extended to mixed actions
as well. For xs ∈ Xs and ys ∈ Ys let
r(s, xs, ys) :=
∑
is∈Is, js∈Js
xs(is) ys(js) · r(s, is, js),
p(t|s, xs, ys) :=
∑
is∈Is, js∈Js
xs(is) ys(js) · p(t|s, is, js).
For x ∈ X, y ∈ Y we will also use the vector notation
r(x, y) := (r(s, xs, ys))s∈S .
A pair of strategies (π, σ) with an initial state s ∈ S determines a stochastic
process on the payoffs. The sequences of payoffs are evaluated by the limiting average
reward and by the β-discounted reward, β ∈ (0, 1), given by
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where rn is the random variable for the payoff at stage n ∈ N, and RN for the average
payoff up to stage N . We also use the vector notations






































































SIMPLIFYING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 1333
A pair of stationary strategies (x, y) determines a Markov chain with transition
matrix Pxy on S, where entry (s, t) of Pxy is p(t|s, xs, ys). With respect to this Markov
chain, we can speak of transient and recurrent states (a state is called recurrent if,
when starting there, it will be visited infinitely often with probability 1; otherwise
the state is called transient). We can group the recurrent states into minimal closed
sets, and into so-called ergodic sets (an ergodic set is a collection E of recurrent states
with the property that, when starting in one of the states in E, all states in E will be









the limit is known to exist (cf. Doob [1953, Theorem 2.1, p. 175]). Entry (s, t) of
the stochastic matrix Qxy, denoted by q(t|s, x, y), is the expected average number of
stages the process is in state t when starting in s. The matrix Qxy has the well-known
properties (cf. Doob [1953]) that
Qxy = Qxy Pxy = Pxy Qxy, Q
2
xy = Qxy.(1.1)
By its definition, for the limiting average reward we have
γ(x, y) = Qxy r(x, y),(1.2)
hence by (1.1) we also obtain
γ(x, y) = Qxy r(x, y) = Q
2
xy r(x, y) = Qxy γ(x, y).(1.3)
Against a fixed stationary strategy y there always exists a pure stationary best
reply i of player 1 (cf. Hordijk, Vrieze, and Wanrooij [1983]); i.e.,
γ(i, y) ≥ γ(π, y) ∀π.
Obviously a similar statement holds for the best replies of player 2.









γ(s, π, σ) =: vs ∀s ∈ S.(1.4)
Here v := (vs)s∈S is called the limiting average value and v is known to satisfy the
following equations:









and Val stands for the matrix game value. The sets of optimal mixed actions in As,
for any s ∈ S, are nonempty polytopes. A strategy π of player 1 is called optimal for
initial state s ∈ S if

































































1334 J. FLESCH, F. THUIJSMAN, AND O. J. VRIEZE
and ε-optimal for initial state s ∈ S, ε > 0 if
γ(s, π, σ) ≥ vs − ε ∀σ ∈ Σ.
If a strategy of player 1 is optimal or ε-optimal for all initial states in S, then the
strategy is called optimal or ε-optimal, respectively. Optimality for strategies of
player 2 is analogously defined. Although for all ε > 0, by (1.4), there exist ε-optimal
strategies for both players, the famous example of Gillette [1957], the Big Match,
examined by Blackwell and Ferguson [1968], demonstrates that in general the players
need not have optimal strategies, and for achieving ε-optimality, behavior strategies
are indispensable.










γβ(s, π, σ) =: vβs ∀s ∈ S.
Here vβ := (vβs )s∈S is called the β-discounted value. Optimality can be similarly
defined as for the limiting average reward. Stationary β-discounted optimal strategies
always exist, and x is β-discounted optimal if and only if
vβs ≤ (1− β) r(s, xs, ys) + β
∑
t∈S
p(t|s, xs, ys) vβt ∀ys ∈ Ys, ∀s ∈ S.
We will also make use of the N -stage game ΓN , N ∈ N, which is played up to
stage N and where the reward is defined by the expected average payoff up to stage
N . The N -stage game ΓN , N ∈ N, is known to have a value vN , and both players
have N -stage Markov optimal strategies. Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] showed, using






while Mertens and Neyman [1981] proved that the limiting average value is equal to




Although both the β-discounted value and the limiting average value exist, they
cannot usually be easily calculated. In general, only iterative algorithms are available.
We refer to Raghavan and Filar [1991] for a survey on algorithms.
We will often deal with specific restricted games derived from Γ. Assume that
S′ ⊂ S is a nonempty set of states and X ′s ⊂ Xs, Y ′s ⊂ Ys are nonempty polytopes for
all s ∈ S′. If all pairs of mixed actions in X ′s×Y ′s , for all s ∈ S′, only induce transitions
to states in S′, then we may define a restricted game Γ′, derived from Γ, where the
state space is S′ and the players are restricted to use strategies that only prescribe
mixed actions in X ′s and Y
′
s if the play is in state s ∈ S′. Let Π′ ⊂ Π and Σ′ ⊂ Σ
denote the sets of these strategies. Clearly, the stationary strategy spaces in Γ′ are
X ′ := ×s∈S′X ′s and Y ′ := ×s∈S′Y ′s . For the restricted game Γ′, with respect to the
β-discounted reward, β ∈ (0, 1), similar results can be shown by using a fixed-point










































































SIMPLIFYING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 1335
Here v′β := (v′βs )s∈S′ is called the β-discounted value for Γ
′. Stationary β-discounted
optimal strategies in Γ′ always exist and x ∈ X ′ is β-discounted optimal if and only if
v′βs ≤ (1− β) r(s, xs, ys) + β
∑
t∈S′
p(t|s, xs, ys) v′βt ∀ys ∈ Y ′s , ∀s ∈ S′.(1.7)
The results of Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] apply for Γ′ as well, so limβ↑1 v′β and






Note that we do not claim that v′1 is the limiting average value of Γ′, for even though
the players only observe pure actions, these do not correspond one-to-one to extreme
points of the restricted spaces of mixed actions. However, one can show, by using
an appropriate sequence of discount factors as in Mertens and Neyman [1981], that,
against any fixed strategy in Π′, for any ε > 0 player 2 can make sure that player 1’s





γ(s, π, σ) ≤ v′1s ∀s ∈ S′.(1.9)
From now on, when we speak of rewards, values, or optimal strategies, we will
always have the limiting average reward in mind, unless mentioned otherwise.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we will deal with optimal
strategies. We show that the existence of arbitrary optimal strategies implies the
existence of stationary ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0, and the existence of Markov
optimal strategies. We give such a construction for which we do not even need to
know any optimal strategy. This remarkable result should not only be regarded as a
simplification of optimal strategies, but also as a sufficient condition for the existence
of stationary ε-optimal strategies or Markov optimal strategies. For many classes of
stochastic games, where on the payoff or transition structures special conditions are
imposed, stationary ε-optimal strategies exist, for all ε > 0, while about sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of Markov optimal strategies, comparatively little is known.
Here, instead of providing such structural conditions, the existence of optimal strate-
gies will be proven to be sufficient. Moreover, an example will be provided to show
that the existence of stationary optimal strategies is not implied by the existence of
optimal strategies, so the result is sharp.
In section 3 we show that simplification of strategies can also be employed for a
class of strategies, containing the optimal ones, in view of the rewards they guarantee.
For this purpose we will evaluate a strategy π by the reward φs(π) that π guarantees
when starting in state s ∈ S. A strategy π is called “nonimproving” if φs(π) ≥
φs(π[h]) for all s and for all finite histories h with final state s, where π[h] is the
strategy π conditional on the history h, as defined above. Intuitively, a nonimproving
strategy, for any state, cannot guarantee a larger reward conditional on any past
history than initially. Using the evaluation φ, we may naturally define the relation
“ε-better” between strategies. A strategy π1 is called ε-better than π2 if φs(π
1) ≥
φs(π
2)− ε for all s ∈ S. We show that for any nonimproving strategy π, for all ε > 0,
there exists an ε-better stationary strategy and a (0-)better Markov strategy as well.
Optimal strategies are clearly nonimproving, since they guarantee the value and more
cannot be guaranteed; hence this result implies the above result for optimal strategies.
In section 4 we briefly discuss some extensions of the above results. We indi-

































































1336 J. FLESCH, F. THUIJSMAN, AND O. J. VRIEZE
states by “almost stationary” ε-optimal strategies and by “almost Markov” optimal
strategies. We also discuss the validity of the results when other rewards are used
to evaluate the long-term average payoffs. Some remarks concerning the proofs and
some consequences are mentioned.
2. Optimal strategies. In this section we show the following result.
Theorem 2.1. If player 1 has an optimal strategy then, for all ε > 0, player 1
has stationary ε-optimal strategies and Markov optimal strategies as well.
The proof will be constructive. We present such a construction for which we do
not even need to know the optimal strategy.






p(t|s, xs, ys) vt ≥ vs ∀ys ∈ Ys
}
, X∗ := ×s∈SX∗s ,
so X∗s is the set of optimal mixed actions for player 1 in the matrix game As (cf.






p(t|s, xs, ys) vt = vs ∀xs ∈ X∗s
}
, Y ∗ := ×s∈SY ∗s ;
the sets Y ∗s , called the equalizers in the corresponding matrix games, are nonempty
polytopes (in fact, by (1.5) all optimal mixed actions of player 2 in As belong to Y
∗
s ).
Note the asimilarity in the definitions of X∗s and Y
∗
s , s ∈ S. It is easy to verify that,
for any s ∈ S, there exists a J∗s ⊂ Js such that Y ∗s = conv(J∗s ), where conv stands for
the convex hull of a set. Let
J∗ := ×s∈S J∗s .
As described in the Introduction, we may define a restricted game Γ∗, derived from
Γ, where the state space is S and the players are restricted to use strategies that only
prescribe mixed actions in X∗s and Y
∗
s if the play is in state s ∈ S. The sets of these
strategies are denoted by Π∗ and Σ∗. Let v∗β denote the β-discounted value for Γ∗,
and let v∗1 := limβ↑1 v∗β .
By the finiteness of the state and action spaces there exists a countable subset of
discount factors B ⊂ (0, 1) such that 1 is a limit point of B and there are stationary
β-discounted optimal strategies xβ ∈ X∗ in the restricted game Γ∗ such that the sets
{is ∈ Is|xβs (is) > 0}, s ∈ S, are independent of β ∈ B. In the sequel each time that
we are dealing with discount factors, discounted optimal strategies, or limits when
the discount factors converge to 1, we will have such a subset of discount factors B in
mind.
The following lemma clarifies why the sets X∗ and Y ∗ play an important role when
player 1 has an optimal strategy in the original game Γ. This lemma states that if π is
an optimal strategy for player 1 in Γ then, for any history with a positive occurrence
probability with respect to (π, σ) for some σ ∈ Σ∗, the strategy π prescribes a mixed
action belonging to X∗. In other words, if player 2 uses a strategy σ ∈ Σ∗ then the
optimal strategy π will behave as a strategy in Π∗.
Lemma 2.2. Let π ∈ Π be an optimal strategy for player 1 in the game Γ. Then
for all h ∈ H(α, ω), for any α, ω ∈ S, we have π(h) ∈ X∗ω if Pαπσ(h) > 0 for some
σ ∈ Σ∗. Here Pαπσ(h) denotes the probability that the finite history h occurs when

































































SIMPLIFYING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 1337
Proof. Suppose the opposite. Then there exists a shortest history h̄n ∈ H(α, ω),
say, with length n, for some α, ω ∈ S, and a σ ∈ Σ∗ with Pαπσ(h̄n) > 0 such that
π(h̄n) /∈ X∗ω. Since π(h̄n) /∈ X∗ω there exists a jω ∈ Jω such that
τ := vω −
∑
s∈S
p(s|ω, π(h̄n), jω) vs > 0.
Let s1 := α, let sk, k ≥ 2, denote the random variable for the state at stage k, and
let hk denote the history up to stage k ∈ N. Let
δ ∈ (0,Ps1πσ(h̄n) · τ) .
Let σδ ∈ Σ be the strategy that prescribes to play as follows: play σ for the first n−1
stages and then, if hn = h̄n, play jω, while if h
n 6= h̄n then play an optimal mixed





Since we have chosen a shortest history h̄n with the above property, by the definitions
of X∗ and Y ∗ we have
Es1πσδ (vsn) = vs1 ,
and by the used mixed actions at stage n
Es1πσδ (vsn+1) ≤ Es1πσδ (vsn)− Ps1πσδ(h̄n) · τ.
From stage n+ 1, player 2 plays a δ-optimal strategy, so the choice of δ yields
γ(s1, π, σδ) ≤ Es1πσδ (vsn+1) + δ ≤ Es1πσδ (vsn)− Ps1πσδ(h̄n) · τ + δ
= vs1 − Ps1πσ(h̄n) · τ + δ < vs1 ,
which contradicts the optimality of π.
Based on the fact that any optimal strategy of player 1 in Γ guarantees the value
v and, in view of the previous lemma, it only prescribes mixed actions in X∗s , if the
play is in state s, against any strategy of player 2 in Σ∗, we show that player 1 can
guarantee at least v in the restricted game Γ∗. On the other hand, as discussed in
(1.9), player 1 cannot guarantee more than the limit of the β-discounted values in Γ∗.





γ(s, π∗, σ∗) ≤ v∗1s ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. The second inequality follows from (1.9), so we only have to show the first
one. For α, ω ∈ S let
H̄(α, ω) := {h ∈ H(α, ω)|Pαπσ∗(h) > 0 for some σ∗ ∈ Σ∗}.
Take an arbitrary x ∈ X∗. Using Lemma 2.2 we may define a strategy π∗ ∈ Π∗ as
follows: for h ∈ H(α, ω) let
π∗(h) :=
{
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Then, by the optimality of π and by the definition of π∗, we have
vs ≤ γ(s, π, σ∗) = γ(s, π∗, σ∗) ∀σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, ∀s ∈ S,
which implies the first inequality.
The next result shows the effectiveness of the β-discounted optimal strategies in
the restricted game Γ∗.
Lemma 2.4. Let ε > 0. For β ∈ B, let xβ ∈ X∗ be a β-discounted optimal
strategy of player 1 in Γ∗, and let y ∈ Y ∗. Suppose that E ⊂ S is a closed set of states
with respect to (xβ , y) for all β ∈ B. Then, for large β ∈ B,
γ(s, xβ , y) ≥ min
t∈E
v∗1t − ε ∀s ∈ E.
Proof. Using inequality (1.7) for Γ∗ we have
(1− β) r(xβ , y) + β Pxβy v∗β ≥ v∗β ∀β ∈ B.
By (1.1), multiplying this inequality with Qxβy yields
Qxβy r(x
β , y) ≥ Qxβy v∗β ∀β ∈ B.
The closedness of E implies that, for any s ∈ E, if q(t|s, xβ , y) > 0 then t ∈ E. Hence
for all s ∈ E and for large β ∈ B, using (1.2), we have
γ(s, xβ , y) =
∑
t∈E
q(t|s, xβ , y) r(t, xβt , yt) ≥
∑
t∈E




q(t|s, xβ , y)(v∗1t − ε) ≥ min
t∈E
v∗1t − ε,
so the proof is complete.
Next we discuss some properties of stationary strategies belonging to X∗ or to
Relint(X∗), where Relint(X∗) stands for the relative interior of the polytope X∗ and
is defined as the set of points in X∗ which can be written as a convex combination of
all the extreme points of X∗ with only strictly positive coefficients.
Lemma 2.5. Let x ∈ X∗ and y ∈ Y . Suppose E is an ergodic set with respect to
(x, y). Then vs = vt for all s, t ∈ E. Furthermore, if x ∈ Relint(X∗), then necessarily
ys ∈ Y ∗s for all s ∈ E.
Proof. By x ∈ X∗ we obtain∑
t∈E
p(t|s, xs, ys) vt ≥ vs ∀s ∈ E.
Let Ē := {s ∈ E| vs = maxt∈E vt}. The above inequalities imply that Ē is a closed
set of states for (x, y), so since E is an ergodic set for (x, y) (minimal closed set of
states), we have Ē = E. Therefore, vs = vt =: vE for all s, t ∈ E.
Now suppose that x ∈ Relint(X∗). Then (x̄s, ys) only induces transitions to states
in E for any x̄s ∈ X∗s , s ∈ E; hence∑
t∈S
p(t|s, x̄s, ys) vt =
∑
t∈E
p(t|s, x̄s, ys) vE = vE = vs ∀x̄s ∈ X∗s , ∀s ∈ E,

































































SIMPLIFYING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 1339
An important property of convex combinations of stationary strategies is stated
in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.6. For τ ∈ (0, 1), x1, x2 ∈ X let xτ := τx1 + (1 − τ)x2. Suppose that
E is an ergodic set with respect to (xτ , y) for some y ∈ Y . Let ε > 0 and d ∈ R. If
γ(s, x1, y) ≥ d ∀s ∈ E,
then for sufficiently large τ
γ(s, xτ , y) ≥ d− ε ∀s ∈ E.
Proof. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Since
γ(s, x1, y) ≥ d ∀s ∈ E,
there exists a Kδ satisfying
Esx1y (RN ) ≥ d− δ ∀N ≥ Kδ, ∀s ∈ E,
where RN denotes the average payoff up to stage N . Choose τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
τK
δ ≥ 1− δ.
The strategy xτ can be interpreted as playing x1 with probability τ and x2 with
probability 1− τ at each stage, so the last inequality means that x1 will be played at
each Kδ consecutive stages with probability at least 1 − δ. Hence, with probability
at least 1 − δ, the expected average of the payoffs will be at least d − δ for any Kδ
consecutive stages. Let r denote the smallest payoff in the game. Then if δ is small,
by the law of large numbers we have
γ(s, xτ , y) ≥ (1− δ) (d− δ) + δ r ≥ d− ε ∀s ∈ E,
so the proof is complete.
The next lemma will enable us to construct Markov optimal strategies from sta-
tionary ε-optimal strategies which prescribe optimal mixed actions in the matrix
games As, s ∈ S (cf. (1.6)). Here we present a short proof, which uses some ar-
guments of Bewley and Kohlberg [1978] on so-called irreducible games.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that for all ε > 0 player 1 has a stationary ε-optimal
strategy xε ∈ X∗ in Γ. Then player 1 also has a Markov optimal strategy f in Γ.
Proof. Consider the restricted game Γ∗(1), derived from Γ, where player 1 is
restricted to use strategies that only prescribe mixed actions in X∗s , if the play is
in state s ∈ S. As before, Π∗ will denote the set of these strategies for player 1.
(Note that here only player 1 is restricted, in contrast with the game Γ∗, where both
players have a restriction.) Let v∗β(1) denote the β-discounted value in Γ∗(1) and let
v∗1(1) := limβ↑1 v∗β(1). Let v∗N (1) denote the value of the N -stage game Γ∗N (1),
and let fN be an N -stage Markov optimal strategy in Γ∗N (1). Using the assumption





γ(s, π, σ) ≤ v∗1s (1) = lim
N→∞
v∗Ns (1) ∀s ∈ S.(2.1)
Let f be the Markov strategy of player 1 which prescribes to play as follows: at stage
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on. We show that f is optimal. Let s1 be the initial state and let sN , N ≥ 2, denote
the state for the first stage when fN is to be played. Take an arbitrary σ ∈ Σ. Notice
that f ∈ Π∗, hence by the definition of X∗,
Es1fσ(vsN ) ≥ vs1 ∀N ∈ N.
Thus using the N -stage optimality of fN and (2.1), for any δ > 0 if N is large, then
Es1fσ(R
N ) ≥ Es1fσ
(
v∗NsN (1)
) ≥ Es1fσ (vsN )− δ ≥ vs1 − δ,(2.2)
where RN denotes the average payoff for those N consecutive stages when fN is














so if RK denotes the average payoff up to stage K and r denotes the smallest payoff
in the game, then (2.2) gives









N<φ(K) N ·RN +
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which implies that f is optimal in Γ.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We show the existence of stationary ε-optimal strategies
for all ε > 0, and then the existence of Markov optimal strategies follows from Lemma
2.7.
For β ∈ B, let xβ ∈ X∗ be a β-discounted optimal strategy of player 1 in Γ∗ and
let x ∈ Relint(X∗). For all τ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ B let
xτβ := τxβ + (1− τ)x.
By the convexity of X∗ and by x ∈ Relint(X∗) we have xτβ ∈ Relint(X∗) for all
τ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ B.
We show that, for any ε > 0, for large τ ∈ (0, 1) and for large β ∈ B the strategy
xτβ is ε-optimal. Let ε > 0. Since against a stationary strategy there always exists a
pure stationary best reply, and there are only finitely many pure stationary strategies,
it suffices to show that, for all j ∈ J , if τ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ B are large, then
γ(xτβ , j) ≥ v − ε 1z,
where 1z = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rz. Take a j ∈ J and let E ⊂ S be an arbitrary ergodic set
with respect to (xτβ , j). We start with showing that for large τ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ B we
have
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Since xτβ ∈ Relint(X∗), by Lemma 2.5 we obtain vs = vt := vE for all s, t ∈ E and
js ∈ J∗s for all s ∈ E. Let j∗s := js for all s ∈ E and let j∗s ∈ J∗s for all s /∈ E; so
j∗ ∈ J∗. By the definition of xτβ and by the properties of B, the set of states E is
closed with respect to (xβ , j) for all β ∈ B, so with respect to (xβ , j∗) for all β ∈ B
as well. Thus, applying Lemma 2.4 for Γ∗ and using Lemma 2.3 yields that for large
β ∈ B









ε = vE − 1
2
ε ∀s ∈ E.
Now Lemma 2.6 yields that for large τ ∈ (0, 1) and for large β ∈ B
γ(s, xτβ , j) ≥ vE − ε = vs − ε ∀s ∈ E,
which proves (2.3).
Using that xτβ ∈ X∗ we have
Pxτβj v ≥ v,
therefore
Qxτβj v ≥ v.
For any s ∈ S, q(t|s, xτβ , j) > 0 implies that t ∈ E for some ergodic set E with respect
to (xτβ , j); hence by (1.3) and (2.3), for large τ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ B, we obtain
γ(xτβ , j) = Qxτβj γ(x
τβ , j) ≥ Qxτβj (v − ε 1z) = Qxτβj v − ε 1z ≥ v − ε 1z,































Here player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns. In each entry, the corre-
sponding payoff is placed in the upper-left corner, while the transition is placed in
the bottom-right corner. In this game each transition is represented by the num-
ber of the state to which transition should occur with probability 1. Notice that
state 2 is absorbing. The value of this game is v = (1, 2). It is not hard to show
that there are optimal strategies for player 1 (later we will construct optimal Markov
strategies). Following the construction for stationary ε-optimal strategies, we have
X∗ = X, Y ∗1 = {(1, 0)}, Y ∗2 = {(1)}. Now the β-discounted optimal strategy of
player 1 in Γ∗ is xβ = ((0, 1), (1)) for all β ∈ (0, 1). Take a strategy x ∈ Relint(X∗),
for example, x = (( 12 ,
1
2 ), (1)). Then for τ, β ∈ (0, 1),
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so xτβ is ε-optimal for large τ and β (the strategies ((p, 1− p), (1)) are ε-optimal for
p ∈ (0, ε]). Note that player 1 has no stationary optimal strategy in this game.
Also, a Markov optimal strategy can be constructed as in Lemma 2.7. In this
game X = X∗, hence the restricted game Γ∗(1) is just the original game Γ. The














































and so on. So, as shown before, the Markov strategy f which prescribes to play f1
at the first stage, then f2 at the next two stages, f3 at the next three stages, and so
on, is optimal.
3. Nonimproving strategies. It is in the spirit of zero-sum games to evaluate
a strategy π of player 1 by the reward φ(π) it guarantees against any strategy of the
opponent. For a strategy π ∈ Π let
φs(π) := inf
σ
γ(s, π, σ) ∀s ∈ S, φ(π) := (φs(π))s∈S .
Using this evaluation φ we may naturally define the relation “ε-better” between strate-
gies of player 1. A strategy π1 is called ε-better than π2 if φs(π
1) ≥ φs(π2)− ε holds
for all s ∈ S. 0-better strategies will simply be called better. We will call a strategy
π nonimproving if for any state s ∈ S and for any history h ∈ H(·, s) we have
φs(π) ≥ φs(π[h]).
Intuitively, a nonimproving strategy, for any state, cannot guarantee a larger reward
conditional on any past history than initially. Obviously, all stationary strategies are
nonimproving strategies. Also, optimal strategies are always nonimproving, since they
guarantee the value, and no higher reward can be guaranteed.
In this section we will indicate how the following result, which is a generalization
of Theorem 2.1, can be shown by using similar techniques as in section 2.
Theorem 3.1. For any nonimproving strategy, for any ε > 0, there exists an
ε-better stationary strategy and a better Markov strategy as well.
First we focus on the proof for the existence of ε-better stationary strategies,
ε > 0, and afterwards we explain how the existence of a better Markov strategy will
follow. Let π denote a fixed nonimproving strategy and let
w := φ(π).







, Ws := Val (Bs),
where Val stands for the matrix game value. By using the nonimprovingness of π we
obtain











π(s)(is) p(t|s, is, js) · wt =
∑
t∈S
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hence
ws ≤Ws = Val (Bs) ∀s ∈ S.(3.1)
This is the counterpart of (1.5), however, for w equality does not hold as for the value
v, which causes some additional difficulties. We will define a restricted game here as
well, but this restricted game will only be defined on a set of states s where ws = Ws,






p(t|s, xs, ys)wt ≥ ws ∀ys ∈ Ys
}
, X̃ := ×s∈SX̃s,
so the set X̃s, which is a polytope, is the set of mixed actions of player 1 in state s
which assure that after transition w will not decrease in expectation. The inequalities
(3.1) imply that, for any state s ∈ S, all optimal mixed actions of player 1 in the
matrix game Bs belong to X̃s, which also means that the sets X̃s are nonempty.
Fix an arbitrary x ∈ Relint(X̃). For a pure stationary strategy j ∈ J let R(j)
denote the set of recurrent sets with respect to (x, j). Let
S′ := ∪j∈JR(j).
For s ∈ S′ let
J ′s := ∪j∈J, s∈R(j){js}, Y ′s := conv(J ′s), Y ′ := ×s∈S′Y ′s ,




are independent of the choice of x ∈ Relint(X̃) and also that the sets Y ′s are nonempty
polytopes. One can verify that all states s ∈ S′ are recurrent with respect to (x, y),
if y ∈ Y satisfies ys ∈ Relint(Y ′s ) for all s ∈ S′. If E is an ergodic set with respect to
(x, y) with ys ∈ Relint(Y ′s ) for all s ∈ S′, then, as in Lemma 2.5, one can show that
ws = wt for all s, t ∈ E. Since x ∈ Relint(X̃), this also yields that ws = Ws for all
s ∈ S′, so ws has a similar property as vs in (1.5). The sets S′ and Y ′ also have the
property that, for any y ∈ Y , if s ∈ S is recurrent with respect to (x, y), then s ∈ S′
and ys ∈ Y ′s . Let
X ′ := ×s∈S′X̃s.
Let Γ′ be the restricted game, derived from Γ, where the state space is S′ and the
players are restricted to using strategies that only prescribe mixed actions in X ′s and
Y ′s , respectively, if the play is in state s ∈ S′. Note that, by the above property of S′
and Y ′, if player 1 uses mixed actions in Relint(X ′s), s ∈ S′, then whatever stationary
strategy y player 2 uses, the play will eventually reach an ergodic set E ⊂ S′ in such a
way that w does not decrease in expectation, and ys ∈ Y ′s for all s ∈ E, so intuitively
the play will eventually proceed in Γ′. Now, using ws = Ws for all s ∈ S′, for the
restricted game Γ′, similar results can be shown as for the restricted game in section
2, which completes the proof for the existence of ε-better stationary strategies.
Now the existence of better Markov strategies can be shown along similar lines as
the proof of Lemma 2.7. One has to define a restricted game Γ′(1), derived from Γ,
where player 1 is restricted to use strategies that only prescribe mixed actions in X ′s if
the play is in state s ∈ S. Notice that Γ′(1) is the counterpart of Γ∗(1) defined in the
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belong to X ′, hence player 1 may use these strategies in the restricted game Γ′(1) as
well. Now in the game Γ′(1), analogous equalities and inequalities can be derived as
for Γ∗(1) in the proof of Lemma 2.7, but w has to be used instead of v, which leads




































This example, known as the Big Match (cf. Gillette [1957], Blackwell and Fergu-
son [1968]), clarifies that, although optimality implies nonimprovingness, improving
strategies are indispensable for achieving ε-optimality. The notation is the same as
in Example 1. Notice that states 2 and 3 are absorbing. For initial state 1, the
limiting average value is v1 =
1
2 and player 1 has neither optimal strategies nor sta-
tionary ε-optimal strategies for small ε > 0, but for any N ∈ N player 1 can guarantee
1
2− 12(N+1) by playing the following strategy πN : for any history h without absorption,
if k(h) denotes the number of stages where player 2 has chosen action R minus the





(k(h) +N + 1)2
,
1
(k(h) +N + 1)2
)
.
This strategy πN is clearly improving, since for the history h = (1, T,R, 1) we have
πN [h] = πN+1. Note that, in fact, all strategies that are ε-optimal for small ε > 0 must
be improving; otherwise, by Theorem 3.1, player 1 would have stationary ε-optimal
strategies (and Markov optimal strategies as well).
4. Concluding remarks. Finally we discuss some consequences. For the sake
of simplicity, we only focus on the results of section 2 here.
Remarks on the restricted game Γ∗. In Lemma 2.3 we showed that v∗1s ≥ vs for
all s ∈ S. In fact, this is the only statement for which we needed the condition that
player 1 has an optimal strategy. Therefore, if in a zero-sum game v∗1s ≥ vs holds for
all s ∈ S, then stationary ε-optimal strategies, ε > 0, and Markov optimal strategies
can be constructed exactly as in section 2. It also means that v∗1s ≥ vs for all s ∈ S
holds if and only if player 1 has an optimal strategy.
We also remark that, even if player 1 has an optimal strategy, one can find
examples where v∗1s > vs for some state s. However, if E is an ergodic set with
respect to some (x, y) ∈ Relint(X∗)×Relint(Y ∗), then there exists a state s ∈ E such
that v∗1s = vE (recall that the value v is a constant on E by Lemma 2.5). To see this
one can argue as follows. Suppose to the contrary that v∗1s ≥ vE + µ for all s ∈ E,
where µ > 0. Let xτβ ∈ Relint(X∗) be defined as in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Then
Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6 imply that for large τ and β we have





≥ vE + µ
2
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Here we used that there are only finitely many pure stationary strategies. Let player
1 play the strategy πδ, δ > 0, which prescribes to play as follows: play xτβ as long as
player 2 chooses actions in J∗s , s ∈ E, and start playing a δ-optimal strategy as soon as
player 2 chooses an action in Js \J∗s in some state s ∈ E. Note that if player 2 always
chooses actions in J∗s , s ∈ E, then (4.1) assures that the reward is at least vE + µ2
(recall that against a stationary strategy there always exists a pure stationary best
reply). On the other hand, if player 2 chooses an action in Js \J∗s in some state s ∈ E,
then one can show that xτβs ∈ Relint(X∗s ) yields that the original value v increases in
expectation by at least some ν > 0, so if δ ∈ (0, ν2 ), by the definition of πδ, the reward
is at least vE +
ν
2 in this case. Therefore, π
δ, with δ ∈ (0, ν2 ), guarantees a reward of
at least vE +
1
2 min(µ, ν) > vE , which contradicts the definition of the value. So we
have shown that v∗1s = vE holds for some state s ∈ E.
Optimal strategies for particular initial states. We briefly discuss a generalization
of the results of section 2, which concerns strategies that are only optimal for particular
initial states. Let S̃ denote the set of states for which player 1 has an optimal strategy.
First note that in each stochastic game there always exists at least one initial state
for which player 1 has optimal strategies (cf. Thuijsman and Vrieze [1991]), so the set
S̃ is always nonempty. Using similar techniques as in section 2, one can show that,
for any ε > 0, player 1 has a strategy ξε which for all initial states α ∈ S̃ satisfies the
following criteria: (i) ξε is ε-optimal, (ii) ξε is stationary until leaving S̃, (iii) there
exist stationary best replies of player 2 against ξε, (iv) the probability of ever leaving S̃
is zero with respect to (α, ξε, σ), if σ is a best reply. The difference between this result
and the corresponding result of section 2 is mainly due to the fact that stationary
strategies are not effective in states outside S̃, so player 1 may have to start playing
a behavior δ-optimal strategy if the play leaves S̃, for some δ > 0. Furthermore, one
can also show that player 1 has a strategy χ which for all initial states α ∈ S̃ satisfies
the following criteria: (v) χ is optimal, (vi) χ is Markov until leaving S̃, (vii) there
exist Markov best replies of player 2 against χ, (viii) the probability of ever leaving
S̃ is zero with respect to (α, χ, σ), if σ is a best reply. We remark here that Markov
best replies do not necessarily exist against a Markov strategy, but a Markov strategy
































































This example clarifies the existence of such “almost stationary” ε-optimal strategies
and “almost Markov” optimal strategies for initial states in S̃. The notation is the
same as in Example 1 except for two “mixed” transition vectors in entries (B1, L1)
and (B1, R1), which lead to state 2 with probability
1
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1
2 . For the sake of simplicity, we only focus on the possible simplifications by “almost
stationary” ε-optimal strategies. Notice that if the initial state is state 2, then this
game reduces to Example 2. So here the value is v = (14 ,
1
2 , 1, 0). As mentioned, for
initial state 2, player 1 has no optimal strategy, so S̃ = {1, 3, 4}. Since initial states
3, 4 ∈ S̃ are trivial, we assume the initial state to be 1 ∈ S̃. Consider the strategy ξ
for player 1 which prescribes playing action T1 as long as the play is in state 1, and as
soon as the play visits state 2 then prescribes starting to play a behavior 18 -optimal
strategy. This strategy ξ is optimal and clearly satisfies properties (i), (ii), (iii), and
(iv). Note that switching to a behavior strategy when entering state 2 is crucial,
because by stationary strategies player 1 could only guarantee 0 for initial state 2.
Note also that the use of action B1 would violate property (iv).
An alternative proof for Lemma 2.7. We wish to remark that, under the condition
of Lemma 2.7, other Markov optimal strategies exist as well . Let εn be a positive
sequence converging to zero. One can show that the Markov strategy which prescribes
xε1 for the first N1 stages, x
ε2 for the next N2 stages, and so on, is optimal for a well-
chosen increasing sequence Nn.
Subgame optimality. Note that the Markov strategy f , constructed in section 2,
is “subgame optimal”; namely, the strategy f [h] is optimal for any finite history h.
Alternative rewards and optimality. It is worthwhile to mention that sometimes
other rewards are used to evaluate the long-term average payoffs. The most common
rewards are the following ones:






, γ2(s, π, σ) = lim inf
N→∞
Esπσ (RN ) ,
γ3(s, π, σ) = lim sup
N→∞
Esπσ (RN ) , γ







where RN is the random variable for the average payoff up to stage N ∈ N. It holds
that γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3 ≤ γ4. Notice that we have used γ = γ2 so far. Mertens and
Neyman [1981] showed that the value is the same for all these rewards. Optimality
and ε-optimality can be defined with respect to any of these four rewards. Sometimes a
fifth alternative is to require uniformity from the optimal strategy; i.e., π is uniformly
optimal for state s ∈ S if
∀δ > 0 ∃N δ: Esπσ (RN ) ≥ vs − δ ∀N ≥ N δ, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
The definition of uniform ε-optimality is similar.
Focussing only on section 2 again, we briefly examine the validity of the results
for all these criteria. First notice that it makes no difference in our results in which
way the strategy of player 1 is optimal. Furthermore, for stationary strategy pairs,
all the above optimality criteria are known to be equivalent (for example, cf. Bew-
ley and Kohlberg [1978]), so the simplifications by stationary strategies remain valid
with respect to all these alternatives. For Markov strategies, however, it is somewhat
different. Notice first that the Markov strategy constructed in section 2 is uniformly
optimal (see the proof of Lemma 2.7). Since γ2 ≤ γ3 ≤ γ4 we have that this Markov
strategy is also optimal for rewards γ3, γ4. However, when player 1 has an optimal
strategy, the existence of Markov optimal strategies for reward γ1 is not straightfor-
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